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Abstract
A plethora of recent work has shown that convolutional
networks are not robust to adversarial images: images that
are created by perturbing a sample from the data distri-
bution as to maximize the loss on the perturbed example.
In this work, we hypothesize that adversarial perturbations
move the image away from the image manifold in the sense
that there exists no physical process that could have pro-
duced the adversarial image. This hypothesis suggests that
a successful defense mechanism against adversarial im-
ages should aim to project the images back onto the im-
age manifold. We study such defense mechanisms, which
approximate the projection onto the unknown image mani-
fold by a nearest-neighbor search against a web-scale im-
age database containing tens of billions of images. Empiri-
cal evaluations of this defense strategy on ImageNet suggest
that it is very effective in attack settings in which the ad-
versary does not have access to the image database. We
also propose two novel attack methods to break nearest-
neighbor defenses, and demonstrate conditions under which
nearest-neighbor defense fails. We perform a series of abla-
tion experiments, which suggest that there is a trade-off be-
tween robustness and accuracy in our defenses, that a large
image database (with hundreds of millions of images) is
crucial to get good performance, and that careful construc-
tion the image database is important to be robust against
attacks tailored to circumvent our defenses.
1. Introduction
A range of recent studies has demonstrated that many
modern machine-learning models are not robust to adver-
sarial examples: examples that are intentionally designed
to be misclassified by the models, whilst being nearly indis-
tinguishable from regular examples in terms of some dis-
tance measure. Whilst adversarial examples have been con-
∗This work was done while Abhimanyu Dubey was at Facebook AI.
structed against speech recognition [3] and text classifica-
tion [5] systems, most recent work on creating adversar-
ial examples has focused on computer vision [2, 9, 17, 19,
21, 32], in which adversarial images are often perceptually
indistinguishable from real images. Such adversarial im-
ages have successfully fooled systems for image classifi-
cation [32], object detection [38], and semantic segmenta-
tion [6]. In practice, adversarial images are constructed by
maximizing the loss of the machine-learning model (such
as a convolutional network) with respect to the input image,
starting from a “clean” image. This maximization creates
an adversarial perturbation of the original image; the per-
turbation is generally constrained or regularized to have a
small `p-norm in order for the adversarial image to be per-
ceptually (nearly) indistinguishable from the original.
Because of the way they are constructed, many adver-
sarial images are different from natural images in that there
exists no physical process by which the images could have
been generated. Hence, if we view the set of all possible
natural images1 as samples from a manifold that is embed-
ded in image space, many adversarial perturbations may be
considered as transformations that take a sample from the
image manifold and move it away from that manifold. This
hypothesis suggests an obvious approach for implementing
defenses that aim to increase the robustness of machine-
learning models against “off-manifold” adversarial images
[24, 39]: viz., projecting the adversarial images onto the im-
age manifold before using them as input into the model.
As the true image manifold is unknown, in this paper,
we develop defenses that approximate the image manifold
using a massive database of tens of billions of web images.
Specifically, we approximate the projection of an adversar-
ial example onto the image manifold by the finding near-
est neighbors in the image database. Next, we classify the
“projection” of the adversarial example, i.e., the identified
nearest neighbor(s), rather than the adversarial example it-
self. Using modern techniques for distributed approximate
nearest-neighbor search to make this strategy practical, we
1For simplicity, we ignore synthetic images such as drawings.
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Figure 1. Illustration of our defense procedure for improving adversarial robustness in image classification. We first “project” the image
on to the image manifold by finding the nearest neighbors in the image database, followed by a weighted combination of the predictions of
this nearest neighbor set to produce our final prediction.
demonstrate the potential of our approach in ImageNet clas-
sification experiments. Our contributions are:
1. We demonstrate the feasibility of web-scale nearest-
neighbor search as a defense mechanism against a va-
riety of adversarial attacks in both gray-box and black-
box attack settings, on an image database of an un-
precedented scale (∼ 50 billion images). We achieve
robustness comparable to prior state-of-the-art tech-
niques in gray-box and black-box attack settings in
which the adversary is unaware of the defense strategy.
2. To analyze the performance of our defenses in white-
box settings in which the adversary has full knowl-
edge of the defense technique used, we develop two
novel attack strategies designed to break our nearest-
neighbor defenses. Our experiments with these attacks
show that our defenses break in pure white-box set-
tings, but remain effective in attack settings in which
the adversary has access to a comparatively small im-
age database and the defense uses a web-scale image
database, even when architecture and model parame-
ters are available to the adversary.
We also conduct a range of ablation studies, which show
that: (1) nearest-neighbor predictions based on earlier lay-
ers in a convolutional network are more robust to adversar-
ial attacks and (2) the way in which the image database for
nearest-neighbor search is constructed substantially influ-
ences the robustness of the resulting defense.
2. Related Work
After the initial discovery of adversarial examples [32],
several adversarial attacks have been proposed that can
change model predictions by altering the image using a per-
turbation with small `2 or `∞ norm [2, 9, 17, 19, 21]. In
particular, [19] proposed a general formulation of the fast
gradient-sign method based on projected gradient descent
(PGD), which is currently considered the strongest attack.
A variety of defense techniques have been studied that
aim to increase adversarial robustness2. Adversarial train-
ing [9, 12, 16, 17] refers to techniques that train the net-
work with adversarial examples added to the training set.
Defensive distillation [25, 22] tries to increase robustness
to adversarial attacks by training models using model distil-
lation. Input-transformation defenses try to remove adver-
sarial perturbations from input images via JPEG compres-
sion, total variation minimization, or image quilting [4, 10].
Certifiable defense approaches [29, 27] aim to guarantee ro-
bustness under particular attack settings. Other studies have
used out-of-distribution detection approaches to detect ad-
versarial examples [18]. Akin to our approach, PixelDe-
fend [30] and Defense-GAN [28] project adversarial images
back onto the image manifold, but they do so using paramet-
ric density models rather than a non-parametric one.
Our work is most closely related to the nearest-neighbor
defenses of [24, 39]. [39] augments the convolutional net-
work with an off-the-shelf image retrieval system to miti-
gate the adverse effect of “off-manifold” adversarial exam-
ples, and uses local mixup to increase robustness to “on-
manifold” adversarial examples. In particular, inputs are
projected onto the feature-space convex hull formed by the
retrieved neighbors using trainable projection weights; the
feature-producing convolutional network and the projection
weights are trained jointly. In contrast to [39], our approach
does not involve alternative training procedures and we do
not treat on-manifold adversarial images separately [8].
3. Problem Setup
We consider multi-class image classification of images
x ∈ [0, 1]H×W into one of C classes. We assume we
are given a labeled training set with N examples, D =
{(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )} with labels y ∈ ZC . Training
a classification model amounts to selecting a hypothesis
h(x) → ZC from some hypothesis set H. The hypothe-
2See https://www.robust-ml.org/defenses/ for details.
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Figure 2. Visualization of an image and its five nearest neighbors in the YFCC-100M database (from left to right) based on conv 5 1
features for a clean image (top), an image with a small adversarial perturbation (∆ = 0.04; center), and an image with a large adversarial
perturbation (∆=0.08; bottom). Adversarial images generated using PGD with a ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet.
sis set H is the set of all possible parameter values for a
convolutional network architecture (such as a ResNet), and
the hypothesis h(x) is selected using empirical risk mini-
mization: specifically, we minimize the sum of a loss func-
tion L(xn, yn;h) over all examples in D (we omit h where
it is obvious from the context). Throughout the paper, we
choose L(·, ·; ·) to be the multi-class logistic loss.
3.1. Attack Model
Given the selected hypothesis (i.e., the model) h ∈ H,
the adversary aims to find an adversarial version x∗ of a
real example x for which: (1) x∗ is similar to x under some
distance measure and (2) the loss L(h(x∗), y) is large, i.e.,
the example x∗ is likely to be misclassified. In this paper,
we measure similarity between x∗ and x by the normalized
`2 distance3, given by ∆(x,x∗) =
‖x−x∗‖2
‖x‖2 . Hence, the
adversary’s goal is to find for some similarity threshold :
x∗ = arg max
x′:∆(x,x′)≤
L(x′, y;h).
Adversarial attacks can be separated into three categories:
(1) white-box attacks, where the adversary has access to
both the model h and the defense mechanism; (2) black-
box attacks, where the adversary has no access to h nor the
defense mechanism; and (3) gray-box attacks in which the
adversary has no direct access to h but has partial informa-
tion of the components that went into the construction of h,
such as the training dataD, the hypothesis setH, or a super-
set of the hypothesis setH. While robustness against white-
box adversarial attacks is desirable since it is the strongest
3Other choices for measuring similarity include the `∞ metric [37].
notion of security [23], in real-world settings, we are often
interested in robustness against gray-box attacks because it
is rare for an adversary to have complete information (cf.
white-box) or no information whatsoever (cf. black-box) on
the model it is attacking [13].
3.2. Adversarial Attack Methods
The Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-
FGSM) [17] generates adversarial examples by iteratively
applying the following update for m={1, ...,M} steps:
x(m) = x(m−1) + ε · sign
(
∇x(m−1)L(x(m−1), y)
)
,
where x∗IFGSM = x
(M), and x(0) = x.
When the model is available to the attacker (white-box
setting), the attack can be run using the true gradient
∇xL(h(x), y), however, in gray-box and black-box set-
tings, the attacker has access to a surrogate gradient
∇xL(h′(x), y), which in practice, has been shown to
be effective as well. The Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) [19] attack generalizes the I-FGSM attack by: (1)
clipping the gradients to project them on the constraints
formed by the similarity threshold and (2) including ran-
dom restarts in the optimization process. Throughout the
paper, we employ the PGD attack in our experiments be-
cause recent benchmark competitions suggest it is currently
the strongest attack method.
In the appendix, we also show results with Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [9] and Carlini-Wagner’s `p
(CW-Lp) [2] attack methods. For all the attack methods,
we use the implementation of [10] and enforce that the im-
age remains within [0, 1]H×W by clipping pixel values to
lie between 0 and 1.
4. Adversarial Defenses via Nearest Neighbors
The underlying assumption of our defense is that adver-
sarial perturbations move the input image away from the im-
age manifold. The goal of our defense is to project the im-
ages back onto the image manifold before classifying them.
As the true image manifold is unknown, we use a sample
approximation comprising a database of billions of natu-
ral images. When constructing this database, the images
may be selected in a weakly-supervised fashion to match
the target task, for instance, by including only images that
are associated with labels or hashtags that are relevant to
that task [20]. To “project” an image on the image mani-
fold, we identify its K nearest neighbors from the database
by measuring Euclidean distances in some feature space.
Modern implementations of approximate nearest neighbor
search allow us to do this in milliseconds even when the
database contains billions of images [14]. Next, we classify
the “projected” adversarial example by classifying its near-
est neighbors using our classification model and combining
the resulting predictions. In practice, we pre-compute the
classifications for all images in the image database and store
them in a key-value map [7] to make prediction efficient.
We combine predictions by taking a weighted average of
the softmax probability vector of all the nearest neighbors4.
The final class prediction is the arg max of this average vec-
tor. We study three strategies for weighting the importance
of each of the K predictions in the overall average:
Uniform weighting (UW) assigns the same weight (w=
1/K) to each of the predictions in the average.
We also experimented with two confidence-based
weighting schemes that take into account the “confidence”
that the classification model has in its prediction for a par-
ticular neighbor. This is important because, empirically,
we observe that “spurious” neighbors exist that do not cor-
respond to any of the classes under consideration, as dis-
played in Figure 2 (center row, fourth retrieved image). The
entropy of the softmax distribution for such neighbors is
very high, suggesting we should reduce their contribution
to the overall average. We study two measures for compute
the weight, w, associated with a neighbor: (1) an entropy-
based measure, CBW-E(ntropy); and (2) a measure for di-
versity among the top-scoring classes, CBW-D(iversity).
CBW-E measures the entropy gap between a class pre-
diction and the entropy of a uniform prediction. Hence, for
softmax vector s over C classes (∀c ∈ {1, . . . , C} : sc ∈
4In preliminary experiments, we also tried averaging “hard” rather than
“soft” predictions but we did not find that to work better in practice.
[0, 1] and
∑
c∈{1,...,C} sc = 1), the weight w is given by:
w =
∣∣∣∣∣logC +
C∑
c=1
sc log sc
∣∣∣∣∣ .
CBW-D computes w as a function of the difference be-
tween the maximum value of the softmax distribution and
the next top M values. Specifically, let sˆ be the sorted
(in descending order) version of the softmax vector s. The
weight w is defined as:
w =
M+1∑
m=2
(sˆ1 − sˆm)P .
We tuned M and P using cross-validation in preliminary
experiments, and set M = 20 and P = 3 in all experiments
that we present in the paper.
5. Experiments: Gray and Black-Box Settings
To evaluate the effectiveness of our defense strategy, we
performed a series of image-classification experiments on
the ImageNet dataset. Following [16], we assume an ad-
versary that uses the state-of-the-art PGD adversarial at-
tack method (see Section 3.2) with 10 iterations. In the ap-
pendix, we also present results obtained using other attack
methods.
5.1. Experimental Setup
To perform image classification, we use ResNet-18 and
ResNet-50 models [11] that were trained on the ImageNet
training set. We consider two different attack settings:
(1) a gray-box attack setting in which the model used to
generate the adversarial images is the same as the image-
classification model, viz. the ResNet-50; and (2) a black-
box attack setting in which the adversarial images are gener-
ated using the ResNet-18 model and the prediction model is
ResNet-50 (following [10]). We experiment with a number
of different implementations of the nearest-neighbor search
defense strategy by varying: (1) the image database that is
queried by the defense and (2) the features that are used as
basis for the nearest-neighbor search.
Image database. We experiment with three different
web-scale image databases as the basis for our nearest-
neighbor defense.
• IG-N -? refers to a database of N public images with
associated hashtags that is collected from a social me-
dia website, where ? can take two different values.
Specifically, IG-N -All comprises images that were se-
lected at random. Following [20], IG-N -Targeted con-
tains exclusively images that were tagged with at least
one 1, 500 hashtags that match one of the 1, 000 classes
in the ImageNet-1K benchmark. The 1, 500 hashtags
Image database
Clean Gray box Black box
UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D
IG-50B-All (conv 5 1-RMAC) 0.632 0.644 0.676 0.395 0.411 0.427 0.448 0.459 0.491
IG-1B-Targeted (conv 5 1) 0.659 0.664 0.681 0.415 0.429 0.462 0.568 0.574 0.587
IN-1.3M (conv 5 1) 0.472 0.469 0.471 0.285 0.286 0.286 0.311 0.312 0.312
Table 1. ImageNet classification accuracies of a ResNet-50 using our nearest-neighbor defense with three different weighting strategies
(UW, CBW-E, and CBW-D) on PGD adversarial ImageNet images with a normalized `2 distance of 0.06. Nearest-neighbor searches were
performed on three image databases (rows) with K=50. Accuracies using KNN defense on clean images are included for reference.
were obtained by canonicalizing all synonyms corre-
sponding to the synsets, which is why the dataset con-
tains more hashtags than classes. Our largest database
contains N= 50 billion images.
• YFCC-100M is a publicly available dataset of 100 mil-
lion Flickr images with associated meta-data [33].
• IN-1.3M refers to the training split of the publicly
ImageNet-1K dataset of approximately 1.28M images.
Features. We constructed feature representations for
the images in each of these image databases were con-
structed by: (1) computing pre-ReLU activations from the
conv 2 3, conv 3 4, conv 4 6, or conv 5 1 layer of
a ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet-1K and (2) reducing
these feature representations to 256 dimensions using a
spatial average pooling followed by PCA. For our largest
database of 50 billion images, we used a feature repre-
sentation that requires less storage: following [20], we
use conv 5 1-RMAC features that were obtained by using
conv 5 1 features from a ResNet-50 model followed by
R-MAC pooling [34], bit quantization, and dimensionality
reduction (see the appendix for details).
5.2. Results
Table 4 presents the classification accuracy of a ResNet-
50 using our defense strategy on PGD adversarial ImageNet
images with a normalized `2 dissimilarity of 0.06; the ta-
ble presents results in both the gray-box and the black-
box settings. The table presents results for both the uni-
form weighting (UW) and the confidence-based weight-
ing (CBW-E and CBW-D) strategies, performing nearest-
neighbor search in three different image databases using a
value of K= 50. The results presented in the table demon-
strate the potential of large-scale nearest neighbors as a de-
fense strategy: our best model achieves a top-1 accuracy
of 46.2% in the gray-box and of 58.7% in the black-box
setting. The results also show that CBW-D weighting con-
sistently outperforms the other weighting schemes, and that
the use of web-scale IG-N -* databases with billions of im-
ages leads to substantially more effective defenses than us-
ing the ImageNet training set.
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Figure 3. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using our CBW-
D defense on PGD adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of
the normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses
are implemented via nearest-neighbor search using conv 5 1 fea-
tures on the IG-1B-Targeted (solid lines) and IG-100M-Targeted
(dashed lines). Results are for the black-box setting.
Motivated by its strong performance in our initial experi-
ments, we use the CBW-D strategy for all the ablation stud-
ies and analyses that we perform below.
How does the choice of K influence the effectiveness of
the defense? The robustness5 of nearest-neighbor algo-
rithms depends critically on the number of nearest neigh-
bors,K [36]. Motivated by this observation, we empirically
analyze the effect of K on the effectiveness of our defense.
Figure 3 presents the classification accuracy of a ResNet-
50 with CBW-D using conv 5 1 features as a function K;
results are presented on two different databases, viz., IG-
100M-Targeted (dashed lines) and IG-1B-Targeted (solid
lines). The results in the figure reveal increasing K ap-
pears to have a positive effect on classification accuracy for
both databases, although the accuracy appears to saturate at
K= 50. Therefore, we use K= 50 in the remainder of our
experiments. The figure also shows that defenses based on
the larger image database (1B images) consistently outper-
form those based on the smaller database (100M images).
5Recent work also proposed a nearest-neighbors algorithm that is
claimed to be robust under adversarial perturbations [36]. We do not study
that algorithm here because it does not scale to web-scale image datasets.
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Figure 4. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on PGD adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of the
normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses use four different feature representations of the images in the IG-1B-Targeted
image database. Results are presented for the gray-box (left) and black-box (right) settings.
How does the choice of features influence the effective-
ness of the defense? Figure 4 presents classification ac-
curacies obtained using CBW-D defenses based on four dif-
ferent feature representations of the images in the IG-1B-
Targeted database. The results presented in the figure show
that using “later” features for the nearest-neighbor search
generally provide better accuracies, but that “earlier” fea-
tures are more robust (i.e., deteriorate less) in the perturba-
tion norm regime we investigated. Earlier features presum-
ably provide better robustness because they are less affected
by the adversarial perturbation in the image, which induces
only a small perturbation in those features. The downside
of using early features is that they are more susceptible to
non-semantic variations between the images, which is why
the use of later features leads to higher classification accura-
cies. Motivated by these results, we use conv 5 1 features
in the remainder of our experiments.
How does nearest-neighbor index size influence the ef-
fectiveness of the defense? Next, we measured the effec-
tiveness of our defense strategy as a function of the size of
the image database used for nearest-neighbor searches. Fig-
ure 5 presents the effect of the image database size (N ) on
the classification accuracy for different attack strengths; ex-
periments were performed on the IG-N -Targeted database.
In line with earlier work [20, 31], the results suggest a log-
linear relation between accuracy and database size: each
time the database size is doubled, the classification accu-
racy increases by a fixed number of percentage points. This
result appears to be consistent across a range of magnitudes
of the adversarial perturbation.
How does selection of images in the index influence the
effectiveness of the defense? In Figure 5, we also investi-
gate how important it is that the images in the database used
for the CBW-D defense are semantically related to the (ad-
versarial) images being classified, by comparing defenses
based on the IG-N -All and IG-N -Targeted databases for
varying index sizes. The results reveal that there is a pos-
itive effect of “engineering” the defense image database to
match the task at hand: defenses based on IG-N -Targeted
outperforms those based on IG-N -All by a margin of 1%−
4% at the same database size.
5.3. Comparison with State-of-the-Art Defenses
In Table 2, we compare the effectiveness of our nearest-
neighbor defense with that of other state-of-the-art defense
strategies. Specifically, the table displays the classification
accuracy on adversarial ImageNet images produced with
PGD, using a normalized `2 distance of 0.06. The results in
the table show that, despite its simplicity, our defense strat-
egy is at least as effective as alternative approaches (includ-
ing approaches that require re-training of the network). To
the best of our knowledge, our defense strategy even outper-
forms the current state-of-the-art In the gray-box setting. In
the black-box setting, image quilting [10] performs slightly
better than our nearest-neighbor defense. Interestingly, im-
age quilting is also a nearest-neighbor approach but it oper-
ates at the image patch level rather than at the image level.
6. Experiments: White-Box Setting
So far, we have benchmarked our adversarial defense
technique against PGD attacks that are unaware of our
defense strategies, i.e., we have considered gray-box and
black-box attack settings. However, in real-world attack
settings, we may expect adversaries to be aware of defense
mechanism and tailor their attacks to circumvent the de-
fenses. In this section, we study such a white-box setting by
designing adversarial attacks that try to circumvent nearest-
neighbor defenses, and we study the effectiveness of these
novel attacks against our defense strategy.
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Figure 5. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on PGD adversarial ImageNet images, using the IG-N -Targeted
database (solid lines) and IG-N -All database (dashed lines) with different values of N . Results are presented in the gray-box (left) and
black-box (right) settings.
Defense Clean Gray box Black box
No defense 0.761 0.038 0.046
Crop ensemble [10] 0.652 0.456 0.512
TV Minimization [10] 0.635 0.338 0.597
Image quilting [10] 0.414 0.379 0.618
Ensemble training [35] – – 0.051
ALP [16] 0.557 0.279 0.348
RA-CNN [39]∗ 0.609 0.259 –
Our Results
IG-50B-All (conv 5 1-RMAC) 0.676 0.427 0.491
IG-1B-Targeted (conv 5 1) 0.681 0.462 0.587
YFCC-100M (conv 5 1) 0.613 0.309 0.395
IN-1.3M (conv 5 1) 0.471 0.286 0.312
Table 2. ImageNet classification accuracies of ResNet-50 models
using state-of-the-art defense strategies against the PGD attack,
using a normalized `2 distance of 0.06. ∗ RA-CNN [39] experi-
ments were performed using a ResNet-18 model.
6.1. Defense-Aware Attacks
We develop two defense-aware attacks in which the ad-
versary uses nearest-neighbor search on a web-scale im-
age database to simulate the defense. Whilst this “attack
database” may be identical to the “defense database”, it is
likely that the databases are not exactly the same in prac-
tice (if only, because the defender can randomize its defense
database). We develop two defense-aware attacks:
Nearest-neighbor prediction attack (PGD-PR). Given
an attack database D̂A and a function g(x) that the attacker
uses to compute a feature representation for example x,
we first compute the corresponding set of K nearest neigh-
bors, D̂A,K(g(x)). Subsequently, we add an extra loss term
that maximizes the loss between those K nearest neighbors
and the model prediction when constructing the adversarial
sample x∗. Specifically, we perform PGD-like updates:
x∗ = x + ε · sign
[
∇xL(h(x), y) + γ
∑
x′∈D̂A,K(x)∇x′L(h(x′), y)
]
.
Herein, the hyperparameter γ trade off the loss suffered on
the sample itself with the loss suffered on its nearest neigh-
bors. We set γ=0.05 and K=50 in our paper. We perform
an iterative PGD-like update using this objective function,
where we fix the neighbor set beforehand.
Nearest-neighbor feature-space attack (PGD-FS). In
contrast to the previous attack, this attack targets the feature
space used for nearest-neighbor retrieval. Specifically, it
attacks the feature extractor g(x) directly by producing the
adversarial sample x∗ via PGD-like updates:
x∗ = x + ε · sign
[∑
x′∈D̂A,K(x)∇x′‖g(x′)− g(x)‖22
]
.
6.2. Experiments
We perform experiments in which we evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the PGD, the PGD-PR, and the PGD-FS attack.
In all attacks, we follow [16] and set the number of attack
iterations to 10, we set K=50, and use conv 5 1 features
to implement g(·).
We assume a pure white-box setting in which the ad-
versary uses the defense image database (IG-1B-Targeted)
as its attack database, and has access to both the ResNet-
50 classification model and the feature-generating function
g(·). Figure 6(a) shows the accuracy of a ResNet-50 us-
ing the CBW-D defense as a function of the attack strength
for all three attacks. The results show that in this pure
white-box setting, CBW-D only provides limited robustness
against defense-aware attacks.
We perform ablation experiments for the PGD-FS attack
to investigate the effect of: (1) the size of the attack image
database and (2) the amount of overlap between the attack
and defense databases. These ablation experiments emulate
a gray-box attack scenario in which the attacker only has
partial access to the image database used by the defender.
Effect of index size. We construct the attack databases
of varying size by randomly selecting a subset from the
500M images in the defense index, and measure the accu-
racy of our models under PGD-FS attacks using these at-
tack databases. Figure 6(b) displays accuracy as a function
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Figure 6. (a) Comparison of regular PGD, PGD-PR and PGD-FS on ResNet-50 in the white-box setting, i.e., attacker has access to the
same database as the KNN defense (in this case, it is IG-1B-Targeted), (b) Variation of classification performance under KNN-PGD attack
on ResNet-50 with IG-500M-Targeted defense database as the attacker database size increases, (c) Variation of classification performance
under KNN-PGD attack on ResNet-50 using IG-500M-Targeted as defense database, as the overlap of images between the attacker database
and the defense database increases. Note that in (c) the attack database size is always 500M.
of attack database size, showing that the performance of our
defense degrades as the size of attack database increases.
Effect of attack and defense index overlap. We fix
the size of the defense and attack databases to 500M im-
ages, but we vary the percentage of images that is present
in both databases. Figure 6(c) shows the accuracy of our
models under PGD-FS attacks as a function of the inter-
section percentage. We observe that the accuracy of our
defense degrades rapidly as the overlap between the attack
and the defense database grows. However, our nearest-
neighbor defense is effective when in the overlap between
both databases is limited.
The experimental results show that nearest-neighbor de-
fense strategies can be effective even when the adversary is
aware of the defense strategy and adapts its attack accord-
ingly, provided that the defender can perform some kind of
“data obfuscation”. Such security-by-obfuscation is inse-
cure in true white-box attack scenarios, but in real-world
attack settings, it may be be practical because it is difficult
for the adversary to obtain the same set of hundreds of mil-
lions of images that the defender has access to.
7. Discussion and Future Work
In this study, we have explored the feasibility of using
defense strategies web-scale nearest-neighbor search to pro-
vide image-classification systems robustness against adver-
sarial attacks. Our experiments show that, whilst such de-
fenses are not effective in pure white-box attack scenarios,
they do perform competitively in realistic gray-box settings
in which the adversary knows the defense strategy used but
cannot access the exact web-scale image database.
Qualitative analyses of the nearest neighbors of adversar-
ial images show that the model predictions for these neigh-
bors images are generally closely related to the true label
of the adversarial image, even if the prediction is incor-
rect. On ImageNet, the prediction errors are often “fine-
grained” [1]: for example, changing the label golden re-
triever into labrador. As a result, we believe that studies
such as ours tend to overestimate the success rate of the ad-
versary: if, for example, an attacker aims to perturb an ob-
jectionable image so that it can pass as benign, it often can-
not get away with fine-grained changes to the model predic-
tion. Randomly choosing a target class has been explored
previously [1] and is a more realistic attack setting, since
this attack setting is more likely to perturb predictions to a
class that is semantically unrelated.
Our results provide the following avenues for future re-
search. Specifically, they suggest that varying the depth of
the network that constructs features for the nearest-neighbor
search trades off adversarial robustness for accuracy on
clean images: “early” features are more robust to attacks
but work less well on clean images. This suggests fu-
ture work should explore combinations of either features
or nearest neighbors [24] at different depths. Future work
should also investigate approaches that decrease the simi-
larity between the feature-producing model and the image-
classification model used in our approach, as well as train
these networks using adversarial-training approaches such
as adversarial logit pairing [16]. Other directions for future
work include developing better strategies for selecting im-
ages to use in the image database, e.g., using supervision
from hashtags or text queries associated with the images.
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Appendix A: Adversarial Attack Methods
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9] is one of the
earliest attack techniques that has been demonstrated to suc-
cessfully produce adversarial samples. The FGSM attack
produces adversarial samples using the update rule:
x∗FGSM = x + ε · sign(∇xL(x, y)),
where x is the unperturbed input. When the model is avail-
able to the attacker (white-box setting), the attack can be
run using the true gradient∇xL(h(x), y), however, in gray-
box and black-box settings, the attacker may habe access to
a surrogate gradient ∇xL(h′(x), y), which in practice, has
been shown to be effective as well. A stronger version of
this attack is the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-
FGSM) [17], where the adversarial input is generated by
iteratively applying the FGS update over m = {1, ...,M}
steps, following:
x(m) = x(m−1) + ε · sign(∇x(m−1)L(x(m−1), y),
where x∗IFGSM = x
(M), and x(0) = x
A general version of the I-FGSM attack is the Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [19] attack, which clips the gra-
dients to project them back to the feasible image domain,
and also includes random restarts in the optimization pro-
cess. We use this attack over the I-FGSM attack due to its
stronger nature. The FGSM, I-FGSM, and PGD attacks ap-
proximately minimize the Chebyshev distance between the
input x and the generated adversarial sample x∗. Carlini-
Wagner’s `p (CW-Lp) attack attempts to find a solution to
an unconstrained optimization problem that jointly penal-
izes a differentiable surrogate for the model accuracy along
with a distance measure for regularization, such as the `2 or
`∞ distance.
x∗CW-Lp = min
x′
[‖x− x′‖2p + λf max(−κ, Z(x′)h(x)
−max{Z(x′)k : k 6= h(x)})
]
Herein, κ denotes a margin parameter, and the parameter
λf relatively weighs the losses from the distance penalty
and accuracy surrogate (hinge loss of predicting an incor-
rect class). The most common values for p are p = 2 and
p = ∞; we use the implementation of [10] to implement
FGSM, IFGSM, PGD, and CW-L2. For all the above at-
tacks, we enforce that the image remains within [0, 1]d by
clipping values.
Appendix B: Feature Construction
To evaluate the trade-off between robustness and accu-
racy of neural network features at different depths (layers),
we use features extracted from different layers of ResNet-
50 models [11] as the basis for retrieving nearest neighbors.
Since layers are very high-dimensional, we reduce the final
dimensionality of the feature vectors to 256 by performing a
spatial average pooling followed by PCA (see Table 3 for a
complete description). We found that spatial average pool-
ing step helps in increasing accuracy as well as the compu-
tational efficiency of PCA.
Feature Layer Uncompressed Size Pooled Size
conv 2 3 256× 56× 56 256× 7× 7
conv 3 4 512× 28× 28 512× 7× 7
conv 4 6 1024× 14× 14 1024× 4× 4
conv 5 1 2048× 7× 7 2048× 1× 1
Table 3. Feature vector details. All features are finally compressed
to a dimensionality of 256 by a PCA done over 3M samples.
The features are extracted using the PyTorch [26] frame-
work; we use the SciPy [15] implemention of online PCA
for dimensionality reduction. The PCA was computed on
3 million randomly selected samplesfor the IG and YFCC
datasets, and on the complete training set for ImageNet.
For nearest-neighbor matching, we construct a pipeline
using the GPU implementation of the FAISS [14] library;
we refer the readers to the original paper for more details
about billion-scale fast similarity search.
Appendix C: Hard versus Soft
Combination of Predictions
As discussed in the main paper, we evaluate both hard
and soft prediction combinations, as described below:
Soft Combination (SC): We return the weighted av-
erage of the softmax probability vector of all the nearest
neighbors. The predicted class is then the arg max of this
average vector. This corresponds to a “soft” combination of
the model predictions over the data manifold.
Hard Combination (HC): In this case, each nearest
neighbor votes for its “hard” predicted class with some
weight. The final prediction is then taken as the most com-
monly predicted class.
In Table 4, we present the results of both these ap-
proaches with uniform weighing (UW) and confidence-
based weighing (CBW). These results were obtained using
the same experimental setup as described in the main paper.
Appendix D: Results with FGSM and CWL-2
Below, we present results that measure the effectiveness
of our defense strategy against the FGSM and CWL-2 at-
tacks. All experiments follow the same experimental setup
as described in the main paper (but use a different attack
method).
Effect of Number of Neighbors, K. Figures 7 and 8 de-
scribe the effect of varying K under FGSM and CWL-2
Image database
Clean Gray box Black box
Soft Combination Hard Combination Soft Combination Hard Combination Soft Combination Hard Combination
UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D UW CBW-E CBW-D
IG-50B-All (conv 5 1-RMAC) 0.632 0.644 0.676 0.637 0.642 0.649 0.395 0.411 0.427 0.402 0.403 0.414 0.448 0.459 0.491 0.457 0.462 0.473
IG-1B-Targeted (conv 5 1) 0.659 0.664 0.681 0.668 0.671 0.673 0.415 0.429 0.462 0.418 0.423 0.437 0.568 0.574 0.587 0.554 0.561 0.571
IN-1.3M (conv 5 1) 0.472 0.469 0.471 0.475 0.472 0.473 0.285 0.286 0.286 0.291 0.289 0.293 0.311 0.312 0.312 0.316 0.309 0.314
Table 4. ImageNet classification accuracies of ResNet-50 on PGD-generated images with a normalized `2 distance of 0.06, using our
nearest-neighbor defenses with three different image databases on both soft and hard combination techniques, with three different weighing
strategies (UW, CBW-E and CBW-D), and K=50. Accuracies on clean images are included for reference.
attacks. We observe similar trends as for the PGD attacks.
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Figure 7. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using our CBW-D
defense on FGSM adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of
the normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses
are implemented via nearest-neighbor search using conv 5 1 fea-
tures on the IG-1B-Targeted (solid lines) and IG-100M-Targeted
(dashed lines). Results are for the black-box setting.
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Figure 8. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using our CBW-D
defense on CWL-2 adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of
the normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses
are implemented via nearest-neighbor search using conv 5 1 fea-
tures on the IG-1B-Targeted (solid lines) and IG-100M-Targeted
(dashed lines). Results are for the black-box setting.
Effect of Image Database Size. Figure 9 and 10 describe
the effect of varying the index size under FGSM and CWL-
2 attacks. We observe similar trends as for the PGD attacks.
Effect of Feature Space. Figure 11 and 12 present classi-
fication accuracies obtained using CBW-D defenses based
on four different feature representations of the images in
the IG-1B-Targeted database, for the FGSM and CWL-2 at-
tacks respectively. We observe a similar trend as in the case
of PGD attacks.
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Figure 9. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on FGSM adversarial ImageNet images, using the IG-N -Targeted
database (solid lines) and IG-N -All database (dashed lines) with different values of N . Results are presented in the gray-box (left) and
black-box (right) settings.
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Figure 10. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on CWL-2 adversarial ImageNet images, using the IG-N -
Targeted database (solid lines) and IG-N -All database (dashed lines) with different values of N . Results are presented in the gray-box
(left) and black-box (right) settings.
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Figure 11. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on FGSM adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of the
normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses use four different feature representations of the images in the IG-1B-Targeted
image database. Results are presented for the gray-box (left) and black-box (right) settings.
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Figure 12. Classification accuracy of ResNet-50 using the CBW-D defense on CWL-2 adversarial ImageNet images, as a function of the
normalized `2 norm of the adversarial perturbation. Defenses use four different feature representations of the images in the IG-1B-Targeted
image database. Results are presented for the gray-box (left) and black-box (right) settings.
